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Abstract
Trade costs are known to be a major obstacle to international economic integration.
Following the approach of New Open Economy Macroeconomics, this paper explores
the e¤ects of international trade costs in a micro-founded general equilibrium model
that also allows for pricing to market. Trade costs are shown to create an endogenous
home bias in consumption and reduce cross-country consumption correlations. In
addition, trade costs magnify exchange rate volatility in response to monetary shocks
and typically turn a monetary expansion into a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. It is
striking that trade costs generally lead to these results both under producer and
local currency pricing.
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1 Introduction
Trade costs have long been known as a major obstacle to international economic integration. In
a recent survey, James Anderson and Eric van Wincoop (2004) show that empirical trade costs
are large even when formal barriers to trade do not exist. They argue that the tari¤ equivalent
of representative international trade costs is around 74%. This paper puts trade costs in the
spotlight by integrating them into a rigorous micro-founded general equilibrium model. The
central focus of the paper is to explore their theoretical e¤ects on cross-country consumption
correlations, exchange rate volatility and welfare.
Following the approach of New Open EconomyMacroeconomics, the paper demonstrates that
even moderate international trade costs can substantially tone down the cross-country correlation
of consumption. Trade costs are therefore likely to play an important role in explaining the
consumption correlations puzzle. In addition, trade costs magnify exchange rate volatility in the
face of monetary shocks, and for realistic parameter values they convert a monetary expansion
into a beggar-thy-neighbor policy for welfare. An overarching result of the paper is that all these
e¤ects generally arise under both producer and local currency pricing. The ndings therefore
have the potential to apply to a wide range of modeling frameworks because they do not crucially
depend on the degree of pricing to market.
Intuitively, by raising the price of imported goods trade costs render domestic goods more
attractive to consumers. As a consequence, spending is predominantly kept within the domestic
country and consumption is tilted towards domestic goods, creating an endogenous home bias
in consumption. This containment e¤ect of trade costs tends to isolate two countries from each
other and makes them behave more like closed economies. Shocks hitting one country therefore
have a reduced bearing on the other, weakening current account movements and the international
correlations of consumption and output. As a result of the containment e¤ect, trade costs also
prevent a domestic monetary expansion from su¢ ciently stimulating demand for foreign goods.
For a wide range of realistic parameter values they therefore lead to negative welfare spillovers.
The e¤ect of trade costs is generally biggest when the two countries are of equal size. Intu-
itively, in that case the volume of trade ows is largest and trade costs are most detrimental.
Interestingly, the impact of trade costs is nonlinear such that small magnitudes are su¢ cient to
create a sizeable e¤ect.
The model of my paper falls into the tradition of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics
literature that has evolved from Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogo¤s (1995) seminal con-
tribution. It represents a micro-founded two-country general equilibrium framework with mo-
nopolistic competition and one-period price stickiness. The key contribution of my paper is to
combine this set-up with iceberg trade costs as the central modeling device. As a consequence
of trade costs, many conclusions from Obstfeld and Rogo¤s (1995) paper no longer hold, for
example consumption is no longer highly correlated across countries and a monetary expansion
no longer leads to positive welfare spillovers.
In addition, I adopt the pricing-to-market extension by Caroline Betts and Michael Devereux
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(2000) to allow for local currency pricing. Betts and Devereux (2000) show that local currency
pricing reduces consumption correlations and leads to negative welfare spillovers. My paper
generalizes this nding by demonstrating that local currency pricing is not necessary to obtain
these results. In fact, trade costs generally reduce consumption correlations and lead to negative
welfare spillovers for any degree of pricing to market. Moreover, as discussed by Andrew Atkeson
and Ariel Burstein (2006), trade costs are a plausible cause of market segmentation and thus
provide a good motivation for local currency pricing and deviations from the law of one price.
Paul Krugman (1980) is the rst author to introduce iceberg trade costs into a monopolistic
competition framework but he focuses on trade and increasing returns and does not model money
nor the exchange rate. John Fender and Chong Yip (2000) consider a unilateral tari¤ but not
symmetric trade costs. Ravn and Mazzenga (2004) evaluate the e¤ect of transportation costs in
a real business cycle approach. Apart from the exible-price environment their paper is di¤erent
by assuming a home bias in preferences. The latter assumption is also made by Francis Warnock
(2003), whereas in my paper preferences are deliberately not biased. Unbiased preferences are
supported by micro-evidence from Carolyn Evans (2001) and in combination with trade costs,
they give rise to an endogenous home bias in consumption.
My model is closely related in spirit to the paper by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000). They
have given trade costs new impetus by pointing out their potential to elucidate major puzzles
of international macroeconomics like the consumption correlations puzzle. But Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ (2000) only use a small open endowment economy model, as do Paul Bergin and Reuven
Glick (2006) who introduce heterogeneous iceberg trade costs and endogenous tradability. Al-
lan Brunner and Kanda Naknoi (2003) integrate trade costs into a more rigorous two-country
general equilibrium model with production, assuming full pass-through of the exchange rate.
Generalizing this framework even further, my paper allows for less than full pass-through, shows
that trade costs reduce consumption correlations across countries and also conducts a welfare
analysis. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the e¤ects of trade costs are typically most pro-
nounced when two countries are of equal size. Intuitively, when two countries are equally big,
the overall reliance on trade is largest and the impact of trade costs is felt most strongly.
The inclusion of trade costs yields results that are in some respects similar to the ones
obtained by David Backus and Gregor Smith (1993) and Harald Hau (2000) in their models
with nontradable goods. Hau (2000) also nds that consumption becomes less correlated across
countries and that both nominal and real exchange rates are more volatile in the presence of
monetary shocks. But my paper obtains these results with tradable goods only. The abstraction
from nontradable goods is motivated by empirical evidence by Charles Engel (1999) and V. V.
Chari, Patrick Kehoe and Ellen McGrattan (2002), showing that the relative price of nontradable
goods accounts for virtually none of U.S. and European real exchange rate movements. Instead,
the real exchange rate appears to be driven almost exclusively by the relative price of tradable
goods.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces trade costs into a New Open Econ-
omy Macroeconomics model with sticky prices. Section 3 describes its exible-price equilibrium,
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establishing the endogenous home bias in consumption. Section 4 discusses the e¤ects of mon-
etary shocks under sticky prices with particular focus on the volatility of real and nominal ex-
change rates. It also presents simulation results, showing that moderate values of trade costs can
lead to substantial reductions in cross-country consumption correlations. In Section 5 I conduct
a welfare analysis with the result that a monetary expansion is typically a beggar-thy-neighbor
policy in the presence of trade costs. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model with Trade Costs
The model follows the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature and is based on the
pricing-to-market setting in Betts and Devereux (2000). As a new ingredient there exist exoge-
nous icebergtrade costs  , where  represents the fraction of goods that melts away during
the trading process with 0   < 1. If  = 0 we have the special case of frictionless trade that
is customary in the literature. In the extreme case of  ! 1, trade between the two countries
breaks down and they become closed economies.
Households choose among a continuum [0; 1] of di¤erentiated, nondurable and tradable goods
which are produced by monopolistic rms. The sizes of the Home and Foreign countries are n
and 1 n with 0 < n < 1. As in Betts and Devereux (2000), it is assumed that s with 0  s  1
is the fraction of rms in each country that engage in pricing to market (PTM) and that can
price-discriminate across the two countries because households cannot arbitrage away potential
cross-country price di¤erences. If s = 0 all rms set prices in producer currency, if s = 1 all
rms set prices in local currency.
2.1 Households
Households derive utility from consumption Ct and also from real money balances Mt=Pt due to
a transactionary motive but they dislike work ht. In Home country notation utility is given by
Ut =
1X
v=t
v t
 
lnCv +

1  

Mv
Pv
1 
+  ln (1  hv)
!
(1)
with the composite consumption index dened as
Ct 
Z 1
0
cit

 1


d i
 
 1
(2)
where  is the elasticity of substitution with  > 1, cit is consumption of good i at time t, 
is the subjective discount factor with 0 <  < 1, Mt is the money supply and ht represents
labor. The parameters , , ,  and  are positive and identical across countries. All above
variables Ct and ht etc. are Home per-capita variables. Since all households within one country
are identical by construction, the corresponding Home aggregate quantities are nCt and nht etc.
Note that unlike in Warnock (2003) there is no home bias in preferences.
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The Home consumption-based price index is dened as the minimum expenditure subject to
Ct = 1 and can be derived as1
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The Foreign price index is given by
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where prices p represent Home currency goods prices and prices q represent Foreign currency
goods prices. In general, asterisks indicate Foreign country variables but in the context of goods
prices an asterisk means that a price is set by a Foreign rm. Thus, all pit are set by Foreign
rms in Home currency and all qit are set by Foreign rms in Foreign currency.
The goods in the range [0; n] are produced by Home rms and the goods in the range [n; 1]
are produced by Foreign rms. In the Home price index (3), Foreign rms price to market for
the goods in the range [n; n + (1   n)s], i.e. they set the corresponding prices pit in Home
currency. The range [n + (1   n)s; 1] represents the goods produced by Foreign rms that do
not price to market and therefore set prices qit in Foreign currency. These are converted into
Home currency through multiplying by the nominal exchange rate et, which is dened as the
Home price of Foreign currency.
Note that the factor 11  is included in the range [n; 1] of Home index (3) as well as in the
range [0; n] of Foreign index (4). The reason is that all prices pit, pit, qit, q

it are f.o.b. (free on
board) unit prices that are charged at the factory gate. If a Foreign good is shipped to the Home
country, only the fraction (1   ) arrives. The Home consumer must therefore buy 11  units
in the Foreign country so that one full unit arrives in the Home country. Hence, from a Home
consumers perspective 11  p

it is the c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) unit price of a Foreign
pricing-to-market good, and 11  etq

it is the c.i.f. unit price of a Foreign non-pricing-to-market
good. One can think of this f.o.b./c.i.f. relationship as rmscharging an additional markup for
shipping the purchased goods over to the destination country.2
Asset markets are complete domestically such that each household owns an equal share of
an initial stock of domestic currency and an equal share of all domestic rms. There is no bond
denominated in Foreign currency but there is free and costless trade in a Home currency nominal
discount bond. Ft represents the Home holdings of the bond maturing in period t+ 1 and dt is
its price. The Home budget constraint at time t in per-capita terms is thus given by
PtCt +Mt + dtFt =Wtht + t +Mt 1 + Zt + Ft 1 (5)
1The derivations of this section are outlined in Appendix A.
2However, the fraction  of goods gets lost in the trading process so that rms do not receive the additional
markup. See Section 4.4 for a rebate of trade costs.
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where Wt is the nominal wage rate, t are Home rmsprots and Zt are nominal lump-sum
transfers from the Home government.
The Home consumption demand function can be derived as
cit =

it
Pt
 
Ct (6)
where
it =
8><>:
pit for 0  i  n
1
1  p

it for n  i  n+ (1  n)s
1
1  etq

it for n+ (1  n)s  i  1
(7)
analogous to the three terms in price index (3).
2.2 Government
Let the composite government consumption index Gt be dened like the private one in (2). Gov-
ernment demand is then analogous to private demand. The Home government budget constraint
is
PtGt + Zt =Mt  Mt 1 (8)
If the Home government generates revenue from printing money, it can either consume goods or
give out nominal lump-sum transfers to its citizens, in which case Zt > 0. The same holds for
the Foreign government budget constraint.
2.3 Firms
Each rm faces the same linear production technology
yt = ht (9)
where yt denotes Home per-capita output and ht is Home per-capita labor input. Note that the
i subscript is dropped as all rms face the same production technology. Home output can be
divided into output destined for the domestic country, denoted by xt, and output destined for
the Foreign country, denoted by zt
yt = xt + zt (10)
Labor markets in each country are perfectly competitive so that the internationally immobile
workers are wage-takers. The Home per-capita prot function for any s 2 [0; 1] is then given by
t = s(ptxt + etqtzt) + (1  s)(ptxt + ptzt) Wtyt (11)
Note that (11) is expressed in f.o.b. terms and that zt is the amount of Home output that is
shipped to Foreign. Due to trade costs only the fraction (1  ) of zt arrives and is consumed in
Foreign. The rst term on the right-hand side of (11) reects the revenue of rms that engage
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in pricing to market and charge the Foreign currency price qt to Foreign consumers. The second
term is the revenue from non-pricing-to-market rms, which always charge the Home currency
price pt. The last term of (11) constitutes the costs of production.
As the demand elasticities are equal in both countries, it follows
pt = etqt (12)
qt = p

t =et (13)
Conditions (12) and (13) imply that in f.o.b. terms there is no price discrimination across
countries under exible prices. Firms receive the same revenue per unit, no matter whether they
sell their products to Home or Foreign consumers. Appendix A shows that prot maximization
leads to the standard price markups for Home rms
pt =

  1Wt (14)
and for Foreign rms
qt =

  1W

t (15)
3 The Flexible-Price Equilibrium
The question of interest in this section is how trade costs a¤ect the exible-price equilibrium
compared to a perfect, frictionless world. As usual in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics
literature, it is assumed that rms set prices after the exchange rate and wages are known and
that initially there are neither bond holdings, government consumption nor lump-sum transfers
so that F = F  = G = G = Z = Z = 0. The time index t is dropped to denote initial
equilibrium values.
3.1 An Endogenous Home Bias in Consumption
By comparing individual goods prices in (7) one can easily see that trade costs drive up the price
of imported goods and thus render domestic goods more attractive. As a result, consumers spend
a bigger fraction of their income on domestic goods. This bu¤ering feature of trade costs will
be referred to as the containment e¤ect of trade costs, meaning that spending tends to be
retained within the domestic country. Trade costs therefore lead to an endogenous home bias in
consumption in each country.3
The home bias arises although the preference specication in (2) is symmetric such that
consumers equally desire all goods, regardless of where they are produced. Of course, abandoning
the symmetry by introducing an exogenous home bias in preferences, for example as in Warnock
(2003), would be an alternative way of explaining the home bias. However, Carolyn Evans (2001)
3Consumers also spend a bigger fraction of income on domestic goods if one assumes nontradable goods, see
Hau (2000).
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nds empirically that the only signicant reason for the tendency of consumers to purchase
domestic goods are locational factors arising due to geographic distance and legal regulations
- but not consumer preferences.4 Her ndings are therefore consistent with the preference
specication in (2) and the models iceberg trade costs but not withWarnocks (2003) assumption
of home bias in preferences.
3.2 A Numerical Example
As shown in Appendix B, equilibrium labor supply is not a¤ected by trade costs because of the
logarithmic utility specication in (1). However, trade costs reduce consumption, real prots
and real wages and hence, they make individuals worse o¤.5 Figure 1 illustrates this reduction
with a numerical example that will be used again in subsequent sections. In order to remain close
to the existing literature, the parameter values are the same as in Betts and Devereux (2000)
who give a detailed empirical motivation for their chosen magnitudes. As the price markup
in (14) and (15) is =(   1), a value of  = 11 is chosen to match an empirical markup of
approximately 10%.  is unity in order to be in line with empirical estimates of consumption
elasticities of money demand (1= in the model) that are close to one.  is chosen to be 0:94,
implying a real interest rate of about 6%, roughly the average long-run real return on stocks.
 is chosen as 10=11. Unless indicated otherwise, the two countries are of equal size (n = 0:5)
and trade costs are set to be  = 0:25 as in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000), which is a moderate
value compared to  = 0:43 reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) in their survey of
empirical trade costs.6
Figure 1 demonstrates two characteristic features of trade costs with a numerical example for
consumption. First, trade costs reduce consumption in a nonlinear fashion. For the moderate
value of  = 0:25 consumption almost attains the magnitude it would have in a closed economy
(i.e. in the case of  ! 1). Second, trade costs have a more detrimental impact on small
countries, as can be seen in the case of n = 0:25. Intuitively, since all the goods produced in
the world are equally desired by consumers, smaller countries are more open economies and
therefore more strongly exposed to trade costs. This latter point is also illustrated by Figure 2
which compares Home consumption C relative to Foreign consumption C. For n = 0:5 both
countries are of equal size and therefore equally a¤ected by trade costs such that C=C is stable.
But in the case of n = 0:25 when the Home country is smaller, relative Home consumption
4Evans (2001) compares prices and quantities of imported goods produced by American rms for domestic
sale with those of the same goods produced by foreign a¢ liates of these American rms for local sale. Her data
set encompasses seven industries, ranging from transportation equipment to food products, across nine OECD
countries over the period 1985-1994. She nds that the ad-valorem tari¤ equivalent of producing domestically and
shipping abroad ranges between 51 and 105 percent across industries, which considerably reduces the attractiveness
of the foreign goods for domestic consumers. Establishing and selling from an a¢ liate, however, does not lead to
any negative e¤ect on sales of these foreign products when compared to sales of domestic goods. In other words,
French consumers do not intrinsically prefer French to American beer, only if it is cheaper.
5Formally, @U=@ < 0 and @U=@ < 0. For given money supply trade costs also decrease equilibrium real
money balances.
6Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) argue that the representative tari¤ equivalent of international trade costs
is around 74%. The tari¤ equivalent of iceberg trade costs is given by 1=(1  )  1, implying  = 0:43.
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drops. Both Hau (2000) and Warnock (2003) assume symmetric country size so that this e¤ect
cannot occur.
In the same vein, if the countries are not of equal size, absolute PPP will no longer hold in
equilibrium because the two countries are asymmetrically a¤ected by trade costs. That is, the
equilibrium real exchange rate   eP =P will be below 1 if the Home country is smaller and
vice versa (see Appendix B). In contrast, in a model without trade costs the law of one price on
the individual goods level inevitably leads to absolute PPP irrespective of country size.
4 Sticky Prices and Shocks
This section examines how key economic variables respond to shocks when trade costs impede
the international exchange of goods and when prices are sticky for one period. The discussion
concentrates on the real and nominal exchange rates, consumption, output and the current
account. Full analytical derivations are given in Appendix C.
As a Keynesian feature of the model, it is now assumed that all prices (pt, pt , qt, qt ) are preset
every period and that rms choose prices to be optimal in the absence of shocks. They therefore
preset the prices of the initial exible-price equilibrium. For a su¢ ciently small shock in period
t, rms have an incentive to produce the post-shock market demand since they are monopolistic
competitors and still make prots. As there is no capital in the model, prices and all other
variables reach their new long-run equilibrium in t+ 1, just one period after the shock hits the
economy. Log-linear approximations are taken around the pre-shock exible-price equilibrium
of Section 3. For any variable X let bXt+k  (Xt+k X)=X be the percentage deviation from the
initial equilibrium at time t+ k for k = 0; 1 caused by either a monetary shock or a government
spending shock. The following discussion concentrates on monetary shocks and an analysis of
government spending shocks is provided in Appendix C.3.
4.1 Price Indices and the Real Exchange Rate
The short-run responses of the price indices to an exchange rate movement in period t can be
obtained by log-linearizing (3) and (4). Under full pricing to market (s = 1) the price indices
are not a¤ected by nominal exchange rate movements since all prices are xed in local currency
irrespective of trade costs ( bPt = bP t = 0). A nominal exchange rate depreciation therefore
directly translates into a real exchange rate depreciation (b t = bet).
But if at least some prices are sticky in producer currency (0  s < 1), exchange rate
movements do feed into the price indices such that a depreciation of the Home currency will
increase the Home price level and decrease the Foreign price level. In this context trade costs
weaken the e¤ect that exchange rate movements have on price indices.7 Intuitively, trade costs
act like bu¤ers that shift consumption towards domestic goods through their containment e¤ect
and thus decrease the weight of imported goods and exchange rates in the price index. In
7Formally,
@ bPt=@bet =@ < 0 and @ bP t =@bet =@ < 0.
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Figure 3: Trade costs increase the real exchange rate movement under producer currency pricing
(s = 0) but not under local currency pricing (s = 1).
the limit as the countries become closed economies ( ! 1), the price indices are completely
insulated from exchange rate movements.
This weakening e¤ect of trade costs has consequences for the real exchange rate movement
which can be expressed as
b t = bet + bP t   bPt = (s+ (1  s)) bet (16)
where  is a function of trade costs and exogenous parameters only.  has the property that
 = 0 for  = 0 and that it monotonically increases in  such that 0 <  < 1 for 0 <  < 1.8
Let us analyze the case of producer currency pricing (s = 0) and a depreciation (bet > 0). In the
absence of trade costs ( =  = 0) the price index movements are exactly o¤set by the nominal
exchange rate so that the real exchange rate does not move at all (b t = 0). But in the presence
of trade costs the price index movements are weakened and the real exchange rate is no longer
xed (b t > 0). The real exchange rate movement is stronger for higher trade costs with b t = bet
in the limit as  ! 1.9
Real exchange rate movements under producer currency pricing therefore approach the ones
under local currency pricing for increasing trade costs. Figure 3 illustrates this behavior with
8See Appendix C for details.
9Formally, for 0  s < 1,
@b t=@bet =@ > 0 and lim
!1
@b t=@bet = 1 since lim
!1
 = 1. This nding also implies
that for some degree of producer currency pricing and a given series of nominal exchange rate movements, trade
costs render the real exchange rate more volatile (see Section 4.3 for simulation results).
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the numerical example from Section 3.2. Figure 3 and all subsequent gures are drawn for one-
percent shocks. Note that the impact of trade costs is greatest for the symmetric case of n = 0:5.
Intuitively, when the two countries are of equal size, the volume of trade ows is biggest and
trade costs are most detrimental. As shown in Appendix C, the expression for nominal exchange
rate overshooting (bet   bet+1) is proportional to the real exchange rate movement (16). In the
presence of trade costs overshooting therefore even occurs under producer currency pricing and
overshooting is biggest when the two countries are of equal size.
4.2 The Nominal Exchange Rate, Consumption, Output and the Current
Account
One can express the nominal exchange rate movement in period t in terms of exogenous shocks
and parameters as
bet = a1(cMt   cMt ) + a2

dGt
C   dG

t
C

+ a3

dGt+1
C  
dGt+1
C

a4(1  s) + a5s (17)
where
a1 =

1 +

1     

1 +

(1  )

 > 0
a2 = 1   > 0
a3 =

1  

1  


> a2 > 0
a4 = (  1)
 
1  2+ 1  (  1)(1  )
(1  ) + 

a1 > 0
a5 =
1
(1  ) + a1 > 0
    1 + 
  1 +  > 1
with 1 <  < .   0 depends on trade costs  and country size n (see Appendix C). Since
a1, a2, a3, a4 and a5 are all greater than zero, positive Home shocks unambiguously lead to a
depreciation of the Home currency (bet > 0). It is assumed throughout the analysis that monetary
shocks are permanent (cMt = cMt+1 and cMt = cMt+1). Government spending shocks are dened
with respect to private consumption C and C (dG=C and dG=C), as there is no government
consumption in the initial equilibrium. A detailed discussion of government spending shocks
can be found in Appendix C.3.
Table 1 summarizes the responses of other key variables to a positive Home monetary shock.
The results can be understood with the help of two switchinge¤ects. Under local currency
pricing (s = 1) relative prices and thus relative demand are xed, but measured in domestic
currency Home rms generate higher revenue because of the exchange rate depreciation. This
will be referred to as the income-switching e¤ect. As a result of the containment e¤ect this
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Table 1 A monetary shock and
the impact of trade costs (cM > 0)
Full PTM (s = 1) No PTM (s = 0)
Direction Impact of  Direction Impact of 
Short runbet + = + >bPt 0 = + <bP t 0 =  <bCt + = + >bCt 0 = + <bht + > + <bht + <  <
Current account
dFt 0 = + <
Long runbCt+1 0 = + <bCt+1 0 =  <bht+1 0 =  <bht+1 0 = + <
+ up, 0 unchanged, down, > reinforced, = neutral, < attenuated.
additional income is predominantly spent on domestic goods, leading to a higher increase in
Home output and a lower increase in Foreign output (bht > bht ). But in the absence of trade
costs the additional income would be spent evenly across the two countries (bht = bht ). Apart
from output trade costs do not a¤ect the reaction of other variables to the monetary shock.
In particular, as can be seen from (17) the nominal exchange rate does not behave di¤erently
because the ratio a1=a5 is independent of trade costs.
In contrast, when a monetary shock hits the economy under producer currency pricing (s =
0), price indices are no longer xed and the familiar expenditure-switching e¤ect comes into
play. The price indices thus take on some of the adjustment process. But as trade costs
hamper the movement of price indices and therefore erode the expenditure-switching e¤ect,
the nominal exchange rate must depreciate more strongly than it would without trade costs.10
Figure 4 illustrates with the numerical example of Section 3.2 that when trade costs increase,
the exchange rate movement approaches the one under local currency pricing. In that case it is
most pronounced because there is no expenditure-switching e¤ect at all. Again, the impact of
trade costs is biggest when the two countries are of equal size.
The erosion of the expenditure-switching e¤ect also manifests itself in the output reactions.
As Table 1 points out, trade costs dampen the increase in demand for Home goods and they
dampen the decrease in demand for Foreign goods. More generally, trade costs obstruct the
10Formally, @ (a1=a4) =@ > 0 is required. This is generally the case unless trade costs are very low (roughly
below 2%) and unless one country is overwhelmingly big (roughly over 98% of world size).
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Figure 4: In response to a monetary shock trade costs lead to a more pronounced exchange rate
movement for all degrees of pricing to market s except for local currency pricing (s = 1).
positive spillover of the monetary stimulus such that Home consumption increases by more than
Foreign consumption. The current account response is therefore also dampened, toning down the
long-run responses of consumption and output.11 Those reactions are similar to the behavior
of variables in the presence of nontradable goods (Hau, 2000) and home bias in preferences
(Warnock, 2003).
4.3 Simulation Results
Two conclusions follow from the results that have been discussed so far. First, trade costs make
both nominal and real exchange rates more volatile. Second, trade costs reduce international
consumption correlations and increase output correlations for most degrees of pricing to market.
These two conclusions are illustrated by simulation results in Figures 5-7. Each simulated
observation is constructed from 100 replications over a draw of 100 periods for uncorrelated
shocks to Mt and Mt . The underlying parameter values are the same as in Betts and Devereux
(2000) and the numerical example of Section 3.2.12 Note that the trade cost value is chosen
as  = 0:25 as in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000), which is moderate compared to Anderson and
van Wincoops (2004) empirical estimate of  = 0:43.6 The simulation results can therefore be
regarded as a conservative benchmark for the e¤ects of trade costs.
Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Volatility
Figure 5 plots the volatility of the nominal and real exchange rates against the degree of pricing
11Devereux (2000) provides a detailed discussion of the impact on the current account.
12 = 11,  = 1,  = 0:94,  = 10=11, n = 0:5.
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Figure 5: Trade costs render the nominal (left) and real (right) exchange rates more volatile for
all degrees of pricing to market s except for local currency pricing (s = 1) [ = 0 for solid lines,
 = 0:25 for dashed lines].
to market s. Volatility is measured as the relative variance of exchange rate movements and
monetary shocks, V ar(bet)=V ar(cMt cMt ) and V ar(b t)=V ar(cMt cMt ). For s = 0 the volatility
of the nominal exchange rate goes up by over 50 percent (from 0:56 to 0:86) and the real exchange
rate is no longer xed. Thus, especially for low degrees of pricing to market trade costs can
signicantly increase the volatility of exchange rates.
International Consumption and Output Correlations
Empirically, output is more strongly correlated across countries than consumption.13 However,
the literature on international business cycles has struggled to explain this phenomenon known as
the consumption correlations puzzle(for a discussion see Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000). Figure 6
visualizes the international correlations of consumption growth and output growth, Corr( bCt; bCt )
and Corr(bht;bht ), that arise in the presence of trade costs. Unless s = 1 trade costs enormously
reduce consumption correlations. For producer currency pricing (s = 0) they reduce it by
over 80 percent (from 0:88 to 0:11). Unless s is big, trade costs increase output correlations.
For s = 0 they are pushed up by about 20 percent (from  0:97 to  0:77). Trade costs thus
move consumption and output correlations into the right direction. It is striking that the e¤ect
of trade costs is again nonlinear such that even small magnitudes of trade costs can have a
big impact. This nonlinearity is demonstrated in Figure 7 for consumption correlations under
producer currency pricing.
As in Betts and Devereux (2000), the simulation results in Figures 5-7 are based on an
elasticity of substitution of  = 11. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) use a lower value of 6, and
13For example, using quarterly data for the U.S., the UK, France, Italy and Germany from 1973-1994 Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2002, Table 6) report cross-country correlations of 0:60 for output and 0:38 for consump-
tion.
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Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) suggest that empirical estimates of  range from 5 to 10.
But for lower values of  the changes in consumption and output correlations are still sizeable,
albeit not as dramatic. For  = 6 and s = 0 the consumption correlation is still reduced by
about 60 percent (from 0:96 to 0:39) and the output correlation is increased by about 7:5 percent
(from  0:93 to  0:86).
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) cannot generate low cross-country consumption correla-
tions even if they introduce transportation costs as a trading friction into their real business cycle
model (also see Ravn and Mazzenga, 2004). Instead, sticky prices in combination with demand
shocks seem to be key ingredients to generate more realistic cross-country correlations. Indeed,
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) use sticky prices in combination with monetary shocks
and local currency pricing (s = 1) to bring down consumption correlations, and by introducing
investment and capital they also yield more realistic output correlations. My paper demon-
strates that in the presence of trade costs local currency pricing is not required to obtain more
realistic international correlations because trade costs reduce consumption correlations even for
low degrees of pricing to market. It therefore seems promising for future work to integrate trade
costs into a sticky-price model that allows for capital accumulation.
4.4 Rebating Trade Costs
So far iceberg trade costs have been treated as a black hole in the model. Although a certain
dead-weight loss is conceivable in the form of red tape and language barriers, some sectors in the
economy are likely to absorb trade costs, for instance transportation companies. In this vein a
recent strand of literature has incorporated a distribution sector into trade models, for instance
Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003).14
As Appendix D shows, all the results that have been discussed in previous sections are
qualitatively the same when trade costs are rebated. It is assumed that by holding a monopoly
on the shipping of goods into the domestic country, governments are able to recuperate trade
costs and then rebate them to consumers in a lump-sum fashion, a set-up which is comparable
to an import tari¤ and a lump-sum transfer of the tari¤ revenue. Intuitively, the results are
robust to a rebate because the relative price of imported over domestically produced goods is
not a¤ected. The containment e¤ect of trade costs therefore still applies.
5 Trade Costs and Welfare
How do trade costs a¤ect the welfare properties of monetary and government spending shocks?
To address this issue, we adopt Obstfeld and Rogo¤s (1995) methodology and decompose the
utility function (1) into Ut = URt + U
M
t where U
R
t consists of the consumption and labor terms
and UMt of real money balances. As Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) argue, unless real money
balances are assigned an implausibly large weight  in (1), URt dominates the overall welfare
14Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) discuss the role of a distribution sector for exchange rate pass-through.
16
Table 2 The impact of trade costs on welfare
Full PTM (s = 1) No PTM (s = 0)
Direction Impact of  Direction Impact of cM > 0
dURt + < + >
dURt  < + becomes 
+ up, down, > reinforced, < attenuated.
e¤ect of a shock and UMt can be neglected. Taking log-linear approximation and noting that
Ct+1 = Ct+1+k as well as ht+1 = ht+1+k for k = 1, 2... yields
dU
R
t = bCt     1
bht + 
(1  )
 bCt+1     1

bht+1 (18)
The notation for the Foreign country is analogous. Table 2 summarizes the welfare e¤ects dURt
and dURt .
The welfare e¤ect of a monetary shock under local currency pricing (s = 1) is particularly
easy to analyze because in that case, the long run is not a¤ected (cf. Table 1). Foreign citizens
are worse o¤ (dURt < 0) because they have to work harder in the short run, whereas Home
citizens are better o¤ (dURt > 0). Since trade costs tone down the labor supply response to the
shock, they also tone down the welfare response and thus, as shown in Figure 8, the welfare gap
between Home and Foreign citizens shrinks.
Under producer currency pricing (s = 0), however, trade costs lead to a qualitative change
in the welfare response. The containment e¤ect ensures that the positive stimulus of a Home
monetary expansion can be for the most part retained in the domestic economy. For su¢ ciently
large trade costs, a monetary expansion therefore becomes a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. Figure
9 illustrates the welfare response under producer currency pricing. Only in the limit when the
two countries become closed economies ( ! 1) are Foreign citizens not a¤ected by a Home
shock.
To summarize, in the presence of trade costs a monetary expansion typically triggers a
negative welfare spillover regardless of the degree of pricing to market, a nding which is also
pointed out by Warnock (2003) for a home bias in preferences and which could also arise with
nontradable goods. For intermediate degrees of pricing to market (0 < s < 1) welfare gains can
therefore be expected from the international coordination of monetary policy (see Corsetti and
Pesenti, 2005). The nding of a negative welfare spillover stands in sharp contrast to Obstfeld
and Rogo¤s (1995) result that in a frictionless world with producer currency pricing, monetary
shocks entail positive and symmetric international welfare spillovers.
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Figure 8: Under local currency pricing (s = 1) trade costs reduce the welfare gap between Home
and Foreign citizens.
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Figure 9: Under producer currency pricing (s = 0) su¢ ciently large trade costs convert a
monetary expansion into a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.
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6 Conclusion
The central focus of this paper is to investigate the theoretical implications of international trade
costs for major macroeconomic variables. This is achieved by integrating iceberg trade costs
into a micro-founded two-country general equilibrium model based on the New Open Economy
Macroeconomics literature. The inclusion of trade costs is motivated by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004)s recent survey in which they show that empirical trade costs are widespread
and large with a tari¤ equivalent of representative international trade costs of around 74%.
Trade costs generally have a substantial impact on the behavior of the models variables.
The overall impact of trade costs is always biggest if the two countries are of equal size. In that
case total trade ows are largest and trade costs are most harmful. By increasing the price of
foreign goods, trade costs tilt consumption towards domestic goods and create an endogenous
home bias in consumption. By impeding trade ows they tend to isolate two countries from
each other and therefore reduce the international transmission of shocks, leading to smaller
current account movements as well as lower international consumption and output correlations.
Simulation results conrm that even moderate amounts of trade costs can signicantly reduce
international consumption correlations. It therefore seems promising for the solution of the
consumption correlations puzzle to take international trade costs into account.
Trade costs also have a major impact on exchange rate movements. In the presence of mon-
etary shocks nominal exchange rates have to move more strongly in order to restore equilibrium
in money markets. Exchange rate volatility therefore goes up. Furthermore, for a wide range of
realistic parameter values trade costs convert a monetary expansion into a beggar-thy-neighbor
policy. For this reason welfare gains can be expected from the international coordination of mon-
etary policy. This nding stands in contrast to the Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) Redux model in
which a monetary expansion creates positive welfare spillovers.
Finally, the model is also combined with pricing to market in order to allow for both producer
and local currency pricing. A general insight from this set-up is that trade costs typically lead
to the same qualitative e¤ects under both producer and local currency pricing. The ndings
therefore have the potential to apply to a wide range of modeling frameworks because they do
not crucially depend on the degree of pricing to market.
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A Households and Firms
Appendix A outlines the derivations of the expressions in Section 2. Demand function (6) is
derived by maximizing Ct in (2) subject to the expenditure given by
Kt =
Z n
0
pitcit d i+
Z n+(1 n)s
n
1
1   p

itcit d i+
Z 1
n+(1 n)s
1
1   etq

itcit d i
This also results in price index (3). Maximizing utility (1) subject to the two-period intertem-
poral budget constraint constructed from (5)
Pt+1Ct+1 +Mt+1 + dt+1Ft+1 =Wt+1ht+1 + t+1 +
dt 1
dt
Mt + Zt+1
+ 1dt [Wtht + t +Mt 1 + Zt + Ft 1   PtCt]
yields the optimality condition for labor supply

1  ht =
Wt
PtCt
(19)
and the money demand function
Mt
Pt
=

Ct
1  dt
 1

(20)
as well as the intertemporal consumption stream
dtPt+1Ct+1 = PtCt (21)
The corresponding equations for the Foreign country are analogous.
Let us now turn to prot maximization. For the rmsprice markups note that with the
nominal anchor (12) the prot function (11) simplies to
t = (pt  Wt) (xt + zt)
From (6) insert the demand functions
xt =

pt
Pt
 
nCt (22)
zt =
1
(1  )
 
1
(1 )
pt
et
P t
! 
(1  n)Ct (23)
Then maximize with respect to pt to yield (14). (15) can be analogously computed for the
Foreign country.
In order to derive the relative wage Wt=(etW t ) consistent with (12)-(15) initially impose
that Wt=(etW t ) = . Then plug this into the price indices (3) and (4), also using the markups
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(14) and (15). This results in the real wages
W
P
=
  1


1
 1 (24)
W 
P 
=
  1


1
 1 (25)
where
 =
"
n+ (1  n)(1  ) 1



  1
2 1
#
> n (26)
 =
"
(1  n) + n(1  ) 1



  1
2 1
#
> (1  n) (27)
Then insert (22) and (23) into (10), again using Wt=(etW t ) =  and the real wages (24) and
(25). Some algebra veries that Wt=(etW t ) =  holds with  = (=
)
1
2 1 .  and  consist of
exogenous parameters only.  and  cannot be solved analytically but by repeated substitution
they always converge to one unique value for all admissible parameters. For  = 0 it follows
 =  = 1, and for 0 <  < 1 it follows n <  < 1 and (1  n) <  < 1.
B The Flexible-Price Equilibrium
Appendix B gives the derivations and analytical results of Section 3. In equilibrium the per-
capita supply of labor and thus per-capita output is the same in both countries
h = h = y = y =
  1
  1 +  (28)
(28) can be derived by combining (5), (9), (10), (11), (14) and (19), noting that in the initial
equilibrium Mt 1 = Mt and Z = Z = F = F  = G = G = 0. The equilibrium real wages are
given in (24) and (25). Plugging (11) and (24) into (28) yields Home real prots

P
=
h


1
 1 (29)
Foreign real prots can be derived similarly as

P 
=
h


1
 1 (30)
By inserting (24) and (28) into (19) Home consumption can be derived as
C = h
1
 1 (31)
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Similarly, Foreign consumption follows as
C = h
1
 1 (32)
The nominal exchange rate is obtained by plugging (24) and (25) intoWt=(etW t ) =  with with
 = (=)
1
2 1 from Appendix A and then using (20) and its Foreign equivalent
e =
M
M

C
C
 1




 
(2 1)( 1)
(33)
The real exchange rate can be straightforwardly expressed as
  eP

P
=



 
(2 1)( 1)
(34)
Note that real wages in (24) and (25), real prots in (29) and (30) and consumption in
(31) and (32) are reduced by trade costs since @=@ < 0 and @=@ < 0 (also see Figure 1).
Relative quantities can be expressed as
C
C
=
=P
=P 
=
W=P
W =P 
=



 1
 1
(35)
If  > 0, for n = 1   n = 0:5 it follows  =  from (26) and (27), whereas for n > 1   n it
follows  >  and vice versa. Thus, in the presence of trade costs a smaller country faces lower
consumption, a lower real wage and lower real prots (see Figure 2).
C Sticky Prices and Shocks
Appendix C outlines the derivations of the expressions in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
C.1 Price Indices and the Real Exchange Rate
The short-run movements of the price indices are given by
bPt = (1  s)1  n

 bet (36)
bP t =  (1  s)1  (1  n)
bet (37)
For a given nominal depreciation of the Home currency the behavior of the price indices can be
summarized as
bPt = bP t = bPt;=0 = bP t;=0 = 0 if s = 1
 bet < bP t;=0 < bP t < 0 < bPt < bPt;=0 < bet if 0  s < 1
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The parameter  in (16) is dened as
  n

+
(1  n)

  1
with  = 0 for  = 0 and 0 <  < 1 for 0 <  < 1. The nominal exchange rate overshooting
equation can be expressed as
bet   bet+1 =    1
+ =(1  )

(s+ (1  s))bet (38)
The usual necessary condition for overshooting is  > 1, i.e. that the consumption elasticity of
money demand (1=) is smaller than one.
C.2 The Nominal Exchange Rate, Consumption, Output and the Current
Account
The derivation of the exchange rate movement (17) is sketched rst. Noting that Ft 1 = 0 by
assumption, combine (5), (8) and (11) to get the overall Home budget constraint
PtCt + PtGt + dtFt = ptxt + setqtz
PTM
t + (1  s)ptzNPTMt (39)
where
xt =

pt
Pt
 
n(Ct +Gt) (40)
zPTMt =
1
(1  )
0@

1
1 

qt
P t
1A  (1  n)(Ct +Gt ) (41)
zNPTMt =
1
(1  )
0@

1
1 

pt
et
P t
1A  (1  n)(Ct +Gt ) (42)
represent goods market clearing conditions. Analogously, for the Foreign country
P t C

t + P

t G

t +
dt
et
F t = q

t x

t + s
pt
et
zPTMt + (1  s)qt zNPTMt (43)
where F t represents Foreign holdings of the bond maturing in period t+ 1 and
xt =

qt
P t
 
(1  n)(Ct +Gt ) (44)
zPTMt =
1
(1  )
0@

1
1 

pt
Pt
1A  n(Ct +Gt) (45)
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zNPTMt =
1
(1  )
0@

1
1 

etq

t
Pt
1A  n(Ct +Gt) (46)
Take log-linear approximations and combine these equations. Note that by using (40)-(42),
(44)-(46), zPTM = zNPTM = z and zPTM = zNPTM = z as well as (34) and (35) one nds
that in the initial equilibrium x=y = n , z=y = 1   n , x=y = 1 n , z=y = 1   1 n . Subtract
the approximation of (43) from the approximation of (39), using dF t =   n1 n dFt, d = ,
CP = py = eCP  = eqy where  = (=)
1
2 1 from above. Also use (36) and (37). The
resulting equation is
bet = (1  )
 bCt   bCt + dGtC   dGtC + (1 n+n) dFt(1 n)PC
(1  ) (  1 + ) (1  s) + (1  ) s (47)
Approximations of long-run market clearing and optimality conditions are required in order
to express the current term dFt in (47) as dependent on exogenous variables. The following
equations need to be log-linearized and combined
Pt+1Ct+1 + Pt+1Gt+1 + dt+1Ft+1 = pt+1yt+1 + Ft (48)
P t+1C

t+1 + P

t+1G

t+1 +
dt+1
et+1
F t+1 = q

t+1y

t+1 +
F t
et
(49)
xt+1 =

pt+1
Pt+1
 
n(Ct+1 +Gt+1) (50)
zt+1 =
1
(1  )
0@

1
1 

pt+1
et+1
P t+1
1A  (1  n)(Ct+1 +Gt+1) (51)
1
1  ht+1 =
  1

pt+1
Pt+1Ct+1
(52)
xt+1 =

qt+1
P t+1
 
(1  n)(Ct+1 +Gt+1) (53)
zt+1 =
1
(1  )
0@

1
1 

et+1q

t+1
Pt+1
1A  n(Ct+1 +Gt+1) (54)
1
1  ht+1
=
  1

qt+1
P t+1Ct+1
(55)
Note that (12) and (13) also hold at time t+1. Also note that dFt = dFt+1 and dF t = dF t+1.
(52) and (55) are the householdsoptimal labor supply decisions combined with the long-run
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versions of markups (14) and (15). As a result one yields
(1 n+n) dFt
(1 n)PC =

(1 ) (  )
 bCt+1   bCt+1
+ (1 ) (  )

dGt+1
C  
dGt+1
C
 (56)
Now make use of the intertemporal Euler equation (21) and its Foreign equivalent in order to
derive  bCt+1   bCt+1 =  bCt   bCt   ((1  s) + s) bet (57)
noting dt = dt (et+1=et) and bPt+1  bP t+1 = bet+1 from (34) and also using (36) and (37). Combine
this result with the money market clearing condition (20) and its Foreign equivalent to yield
(1  s)(1  )bet = cMt   cMt   1  bCt   bCt   (1  ) (bet   bet+1) (58)
From (33) note that bet+1 = cMt+1   cMt+1  1  bCt+1   bCt+1 (59)
and recall the assumption of permanent monetary shocks (cMt = cMt+1 and cMt = cMt+1). Com-
bine (47) and (56)-(59) to obtain (17). Then combining (17), (47), (56) and (57) yields the
overshooting equation (38).
In contrast to (56) bCt+1 and bCt+1 as the long-run consumption movements can also be
expressed separately with the help of the log-linear approximations of (48)-(55) as
bCt+1 = ( 1)( ) hn  1 n    n1 n(1  n )o 1 (1 ) dFtPC
+
n
 1 + n + 1 1 n   
o
dGt+1
C +

(1  n )(1  1 )
	 dGt+1
C
i (60)
bCt+1 = ( 1)( ) hn  n1 n(  n ) + (1  1 n )o 1 (1 ) dFtPC
+

(1  1 n )(1  1 )
	
dGt+1
C +
n
 1 + 1 n + 1 n   
o
dGt+1
C
i (61)
The current account term dFt showing up in (56), (60) and (61) can be expressed as depen-
dent on exogenous variables by using (56)-(59)
(1 n+n)(1 ) dFt
(1 n)PC =
1
+
(1 )


 )
 )
 h(1  s)(  1)(1  2)bet
 (1  )

dGt
C   dG

t
C

+ (1  )

 
 

dGt+1
C  
dGt+1
C
i (62)
where bet is given in (17).
The long-run output movements also follow from the log-linearizations of (48)-(55) as
bht+1 =  
  1 + 

 (1  ) dFt
PC
+
dGt+1
C

bht+1 =    1 + 

n
1  n

(1  ) dFt
PC
+
dGt+1
C

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The short-run consumption movements can be derived by log-linearizing and combining (20)
and its Foreign equivalent, both for periods t and t+1, as well as (21) and its Foreign equivalent,
resulting in
bCwt =  1 + (1  )
 cMwt   1 + (1  )
 bPwt +   1
 bCwt+1
where bXwt+k  n bXt+k+(1 n) bXt+k for k = 0; 1. bPwt can be replaced by exogenous variables via
(17), (36) and (37). Then bCt and bCt can be computed as
bCt = bCwt + (1  n)( bCt   bCt )bCt = bCwt   n( bCt   bCt )
where ( bCt   bCt ) follows from combining (17), (56), (57) and (62). In the presence of monetary
shocks only the consumption movements are given by
bCt = bCwt + (1  n)A1bet (63)bCt = bCwt   nA1bet (64)
where
A1 =
0@(1  s)(  1) +   1 + r   2

+ r

1 + r   

1 + r
 + s
1A
In the special case of s = 1 and a Home monetary shock the consumption movements follow as
bCt = ((1  ) + )cMt > bCt = 0
In the presence of government spending shocks only they are given by
bCt = bCwt + (1  n)
 
1
1+
r
 

1+ 
r

!n
(1  s)
h
(  1) +   1 + r   2 + ri
+s
h
1 + r   

1 + r
i bet   (1  )dGtC   dGtC   1r 1  dGt+1C   dGt+1C o(65)
bCt = bCwt   n
 
1
1+
r
 

1+ 
r

!n
(1  s)
h
(  1) +   1 + r   2 + ri
+s
h
1 + r   

1 + r
i bet   (1  )dGtC   dGtC   1r 1  dGt+1C   dGt+1C o(66)
Finally, the short-run output movements bht and bht can be derived as follows. Note that
ht = xt + sz
PTM
t + (1  s)zNPTMt
ht = x

t + sz
PTM
t + (1  s)zNPTMt
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Log-linearize these two equations using (40)-(42) and (44)-(46). The results are
bht = n  bPt + bCt + dGtC + (1  n ) bP t + bCt + dGtC 
+(1  s)(1  n )betbht = 1 n  bP t + bCt + dGtC + (1  1 n ) bPt + bCt + dGtC 
 (1  s)(1  1 n )bet
where bPt, bP t , bCt, bCt and bet are given in (36), (37), (63)-(66) and (17). In the special case of
s = 1 and a Home monetary shock the output movements follow as
bht = ((1  ) + ) n

cMt > 0
bht = ((1  ) + )1  (1  n)
 cMt > 0
In the special case of s = 1 and a Home temporary government spending shock they follow as
bht = n

dGt
C
> 0
bht = 1  (1  n)

dGt
C
> 0
Note that if 0 <  < 1, then n= > (1  (1 n)=) so that bht > bht in both cases. If  = 0, then
 =  = 1 so that bht = bht .
C.3 Government spending shocks
Let us turn to Home government spending shocks. There are two types - a temporary shock
(dGt=C > 0 and dGt+1=C = 0) and a permanent shock (dGt=C = dGt+1=C > 0).15 If the gov-
ernment unexpectedly increases its spending without simultaneously printing money, it receives
lump-sum transfers from its citizens (Zt < 0) to nance its expenditures. An exchange rate de-
preciation helps Home citizens to generate this lump-sum transfer because it creates additional
income.16 A permanent government spending shock generally leads to a bigger exchange rate
depreciation than a temporary one because the government maintains its level of spending for
all future periods.17 Tables 3 and 4 summarize the e¤ects of the two types of shocks.
The di¤erence to a monetary shock is that a government spending shock does not only set o¤
an exchange rate movement, which entails an income-switching e¤ect in the case of full pricing
to market and an expenditure-switching e¤ect in case of producer currency pricing, but it is
also a direct source of additional spending. The following results generally depend on parameter
values but hold for a broad range of realistic magnitudes including the ones chosen in Section
15 In order to analyze anticipated government spending shocks (dGt+1=C > 0 and dGt=C = 0), a set-up in
which individuals form expectations would be more appropriate.
16a2 > 0 and a3 > 0 in equation (17).
17a2 + a3 > a2 > 0 in equation (17).
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Table 3 A temporary government spending shock and
the impact of trade costs (dGt > 0;dGt+1 = 0)
Full PTM (s = 1) No PTM (s = 0)
Direction Impact of  Direction Impact of 
Short runbet + < + <bPt 0 = + <bP t 0 =  <bCt 0 =  <bCt 0 = + <bht + > + >bht + < + <
Current account
dFt  <  <
Long runbCt+1  <  <bCt+1 + < + <bht+1 + < + <bht+1  <  <
+ up, 0 unchanged, down, > reinforced, = neutral, < attenuated.
Holds for realistic parameter values (see Section 3.2).
Table 4 A permanent government spending shock and
the impact of trade costs (dGt = dGt+1 > 0)
Full PTM (s = 1) No PTM (s = 0)
Direction Impact of  Direction Impact of 
Short runbet + < + >bPt 0 = + <bP t 0 =  <bCt 0 =  <bCt 0 = + <bht + > + <bht + <  <
Current account
dFt  < + <
Long runbCt+1  <  >bCt+1 + <  <bht+1 + < + >bht+1  < + <
+ up, 0 unchanged, down, > reinforced, = neutral, < attenuated.
Holds for realistic parameter values (see Section 3.2).
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Figure 10: Trade costs lead to a less pronounced exchange rate movement in response to a
temporary government spending shock.
3.2.18
As described in the context of monetary shocks, under local currency pricing (s = 1) the
impact of the mere income-switching e¤ect on the exchange rate is not a¤ected by trade costs.
But as a new element, additional spending comes into play with government spending shocks.
Since the containment e¤ect ensures that a bigger fraction of the government spending is kept in
the domestic country, Home citizens are less pressured to generate additional income in order to
nance their governments spending. Hence, in total, under local currency pricing the ensuing
exchange rate movement is less pronounced both with temporary and permanent government
spending shocks.19 Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the exchange rate movements for s = 1 and
varying trade cost values.
As before with monetary shocks, under local currency pricing the containment e¤ect leads
to a stronger increase in Home production (bht > bht ). But now Home citizens incur a current
account decit (dFt < 0) because they borrow in order to smooth their consumption whilst
nancing their governments spending. Again, trade costs tone down the current account decit
and all long-run movements, as summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
We already know from the analysis of monetary shocks that under producer currency pricing
(s = 0) trade costs erode the expenditure-switching e¤ect so that the exchange rate depreciation
is stronger. In combination with the additional spending coming from the government, which
weakens the exchange rate depreciation, an ambiguity arises in terms of the total e¤ect. With a
18 = 11,  = 10=11,  = 0:94,  = 1. Country size and trade costs are set as n = 0:5 and  = 0:25 unless
indicated otherwise.
19Formally, @ (a2=a5) =@ < 0 always holds. For permanent shocks @ (a2=a5) =@+@ (a3=a5) =@ < 0 is required.
For   1, @ (a3=a5) =@ < 0 holds if     < (   1)= (1  ), which clearly obtains for realistic parameter
values.
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Figure 11: In response to a permanent government spending shock, trade costs lead to a less
pronounced exchange rate movement for local currency pricing (s = 1) but to a more pronounced
movement for low degrees of pricing to market (s = 0 and s = 0:5 in this example).
temporary government spending shock the inuence of the additional spending dominates so that
the required exchange rate movement is weaker. With a permanent government spending shock,
however, the expenditure-switching e¤ect turns out to dominate so that in total, the required
exchange rate movement is stronger than without trade costs. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the
exchange rate movements for s = 0 and varying trade cost values.20
Under producer currency pricing the exchange rate depreciation leads to a positive spillover
for Foreign consumption but of course, domestic private consumption is crowded out by gov-
ernment spending such that bCt < 0 < bCt . As Tables 3 and 4 indicate, trade costs soften these
consumption movements. With a temporary government spending shock the additional spend-
ing dominates the expenditure-switching e¤ect and hence, output increases in both countries
and the containment e¤ect channels the bigger proportion of government spending towards the
domestic country.
With a permanent government spending shock the expenditure-switching e¤ect dominates
and the output movements go into opposite directions. The dominating inuence of the expenditure-
switching e¤ect also leads to a current account surplus (dFt > 0) so that Foreign citizens
must decrease their long-run consumption ( bCt+1 < 0) and increase their long-run production
(bht+1 > 0). All these movements are weakened by trade costs.
To summarize the results presented in Tables 3 and 4, trade costs decrease the volatility of
the nominal exchange rate in response to government spending shocks, except for the special
20Formally, @ (a2=a4) =@ < 0 holds for realistic parameter values. Then @ (a3=a4) =@ > 0 is required for
permanent government spending shocks to entail a stronger exchange rate movement. Unless one country is
overwhelmingly big (roughly over 98% of world size), this is generally the case. For small  this might not
necessarily go through, as can be seen from the non-monotonicity with s = 0 and s = 0:5 in Figure 11.
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case of a permanent shock in combination with a low degree of pricing to market (i.e. small
s). Through equation (16) the lower volatility also translates to the real exchange rate. Trade
costs tone down the international correlation of consumption, except for short-run consumption
under local currency pricing in which case trade costs have no impact. Trade costs always tone
down the international correlation of output as well as the adjustment of the current account.
As with monetary shocks, the impact of trade costs is generally biggest when the two countries
are of equal size.
Regardless of the degree of pricing to market, Home citizens always su¤er a welfare loss
from Home government spending shocks simply because government spending does not enter
the utility function, but Foreign citizens always gain. As the containment e¤ect ensures that
the government spending is predominantly kept in the domestic country, trade costs narrow to
welfare gap between Home and Foreign citizens. As with monetary shocks, Foreign welfare is
not a¤ected at all for the limit of  ! 1.
D Rebating Trade Costs
The solution method for the rebating extension is exactly the same as the one described in
Appendix C. Therefore, only some hints and results are given here.
Governments are able to recuperate a share of the trade costs associated with the shipping
of goods into the domestic country. This revenue is then rebated to consumers in a lump-sum
fashion. Analogous to (10) the amount of the Foreign countrys real output being shipped abroad
is denoted by zt so that the real quantity of iceberg trade costs incurred by the Home country is
zt . Let  denote the share of the iceberg trade costs that the government is able to recuperate.
The Home government budget constraint (8) now becomes
PtGt + Zt =Mt  Mt 1 + (spt + (1  s)etqt )zt (67)
With  = 1 the government can recuperate all trade costs, with  = 0 the model collapses to
the one of the preceding sections. For simplicity n = 1  n = 0:5 is assumed.
Output and consumption in the initial equilibrium are
h = h = y = y =
  1
  1 + (1 +  12(1  ))
C = C = (1 + 
1
2
(1  ))h

1
1 + 
 1
 1
Thus, compared to a world with no rebating labor supply is lower whilst consumption is higher.
The expressions for the price indices in (36) and (37) as well as the real exchange rate in
(16) are not a¤ected by the rebate. The coe¢ cients of the nominal exchange rate equation (17)
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change only slightly and now become
ea1 = a1 +  1
2
(1  )
 e
1     
e
(1  )

 > 0
ea2 = a2 > 0ea3 = a3 + 
1   
1
2
(1  )

1  


> a2 > 0
ea4 = (  1)  1  2+ 1  (  1)(1  )
(1  ) + 
ea1 > 0
ea5 = 1
(1  ) + ea1 > 0
where e    1 + (1 +  12(1  ))
  1 + (1 +  12(1  ))
and where all s in a1 and a3 are replaced by e. Note that the equivalent expressions of (52)
and (55) are now
1
1  ht+1 =
  1
(1 +  12(1  ))
pt+1
Pt+1Ct+1
and
1
1  ht+1
=
  1
(1 +  12(1  ))
qt+1
P t+1Ct+1
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